marketing, or R&D information through the mechanism of the pool" (Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2007) .
Existing empirical analyses have been limited to less than a handful of individual industries, which deliver no direct evidence on the role of competition. Historical data on patents and alternative measures of innovation in the 19 th -century sewing machine industry indicate that the creation of a pool discouraged innovation (Lampe and Moser 2010) , and diverted firm entry towards technologically inferior substitutes (Lampe and Moser 2012) . 3 By comparison, qualitative evidence for the CD industry indicates an increase in innovation (Flamm 2012) while data for optical disk drives suggest a decline in innovation comparable with that for sewing machines (Joshi and Nerkar 2011; Flamm 2012) . In the open source software industry, the creation of a pool was followed by a modest increase in entry for technologies in which IBM contributed patents to the pool (Ceccagnoli, Forman, and Wen 2012) .
This paper extends the empirical evidence with a systematic analysis of patent pools and their potentially anti-competitive effects in 20 industries under the New Deal.
New Deal policies, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA, 1933-35) , which exempted the majority of U.S. industries from antitrust (e.g., Haley 2001, p. 8), create a unique opportunity to investigate pools that would form in the absence of effective antitrust. 4 Under the New Deal, regulators allowed pools to form in the hope that they would facilitate economic recovery from the Great Depression. In fact, arguments in favor of patent pools in the 1930s bear a striking resemblance to arguments for patent 3 This result is particularly striking given that the pool did reduce license fees for nine complementary (essential) patents that were required to build a state-of-the-art sewing machine, confirming predictions about pools as a mechanism to eliminate double-marginalization (e.g., Shapiro 2001) . Importantly, the pool created differential license fees and litigation risks, which introduced a wedge in production costs that favored members (Lampe and Moser 2012) . 4 Alchian (1970) conjectures that New Deal policies, which limited competition and increased the bargaining power of unions, kept the economy depressed after 1933. A macro-economic model of intraindustry bargaining between labor and firms, which allows insiders to choose the size of the worker cartel, predicts persistent unemployment and high wages as a result of cartelization policies that limit product market competition and increase the bargaining power of labor (Cole and Ohanian 2004) . Field (2003 and , however, documents productivity increases in telephones, electric utilities, railroads, communications, public utilities, transportation, real estate, mining, trade, manufacturing, services, construction, and finance/insurance. (Posner 1970, p. 376) . 7 In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court broke up Hartford Empire, a particularly pernicious pool in the glassware industry. Arguing for the majority decision, Justice Hugo Black observed that "the history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny over any field of industry…" 8 After Hartford Empire, few pools formed until the Department of Justice revised its antitrust guidelines in 1995 and approved the MPEG and DVD standards pools between 1997 and 1999. 9 Empirical tests exploit this window of weak enforcement to investigate the effects of pools that would form in the absence of effective antitrust. Baseline specifications compare changes in the total number of U.S. patent applications -by pool members and other firms -across related technologies within the same industry that were differentially affected by the creation of a pool. This difference-in-differences approach allows us to control for changes in demand and other unobservable factors that may have influenced patenting at the level of individual industries. Technologies are defined at the level of 5 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 167-168 (1931) . 6 Robustness checks drop pools that formed after May 27, 1935, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that price and wage fixing, which had been sanctioned by the NIRA were unconstitutional (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ). 7 Congressional hearings investigated antitrust violations through cartels and pools (June 16, 1938 to April 3, 1941 Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 436-37 (1945) . Having grown to include more than 600 patents for machinery, which produced 94 percent of U.S. glass containers, the pool had imposed production quotas and prevented licensees from adopting competing technologies. 9 The revised 1995 guidelines treat licensing agreements as pro-competitive unless they can be shown to reduce competition, and allow the formation of pools that combine complementary patents that are necessary to build a specific technology (Gallini 2011, pp. 14-15) .
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) subclasses. Pool technologies are subclasses with at least one patent that was included in a pool; counts of pool patents in a given subclass quantify the technology's exposure to a pool.
Methodologically, our analysis extends existing analyses of patent data by introducing cross-reference subclasses as a conservative control group. 10 One benefit of cross-reference subclasses is that patent examiners -rather than researchers -define them as technologies that are closely related to the affected technology. In the current setting, cross-reference subclasses also help to address a common concern with difference-in-difference estimates, which is that observed effects might be due to differential pre-trends. Until a pool forms, cross-reference and pool subclasses exhibit similar trends in patenting. After a pool has formed, patenting in cross-reference subclasses declines after a small initial increase, which is suggestive of negative spillovers that would lead us to underestimate the true effects of a pool. pool members account for more than 60 percent of output in some industries. 13 This suggests that, to capture their full effects on innovation, analyses of patent pools must consider effects on outside firms as well as members, and investigate changes in innovation at the industry level -including outsiders as well as member firms.
14 Baseline estimates indicate that, after the creation of a pool, pool subclasses produced 14 percent fewer industry-level patent applications for each additional patent that was included in a pool. This result is robust to the inclusion of separate linear and quadratic time trends for pool technologies in addition to subclass and year fixed effects, and to the inclusion of interactions between year and industry fixed effects, which flexibly control for industry-specific changes in patenting over time (e.g., as a result of changes in innovation and patenting over the life-cycle of an industry). Conditional fixed-effects Poisson regressions, which address the count data characteristics of patents and allow for correlation in the error term over time, suggest a decline that is only slightly smaller than the main estimates. Estimates are also robust to excluding pool subclasses with a large number of patents, to restricting the sample to pools that formed before the NIRA became unconstitutional in 1935, and to dropping any individual pool, or all patents by pool members from the sample.
Another potential concern with the basic difference-in-differences estimate is that pools may form in response to changes in the speed of innovation that precede the creation of a pool. To investigate this issue, we estimate annual coefficients, allowing estimates for the pool "effect" to be different from zero before the creation of a pool.
This analysis reveals no significant decline for the pre-pool period; annual coefficients 13 E.g., variable condensers to select radio stations (United States v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949) ) and furniture slip covers (United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ). 14 Existing analyses have focused almost exclusively on predicting effects on pool members. Dequiedt and Versaevel (2012) examine the effects of anticipating a patent pool on firm's incentives to patent. Llanes and Trento (2012) show that innovators are less likely to join a pool with more members because revenue would be shared with more firms. Jeitschko and Zhang (2012) demonstrate that pools of complementary patents may weaken the incentive of downstream firms to invest in R&D if they create knowledge spillovers that lead to a decline in product differentiation and thereby reduce firms' profits. Lerner and Tirole (2004) focus on differential welfare effects of pools that combine complementary compared with substitute patents. Brenner's (2009) model implies that predictions in Lerner and Tirole (2004) depend on members' ability to prevent entry into the pool.
gradually become more negative after a pool forms, and are consistently negative and statistically significant six years after the creation of a pool. Consistent with the idea of a patent race (Baron and Pohlmann 2011; Dequiedt and Versaevel 2012) , patent applications experience a small spike in year t-1 before a pool forms, but this spike is too small to explain the substantial decline in patenting in the post-pool period, and omitting data for year t-1 causes no substantive decline in the estimates.
What is the mechanism by which the creation of a pool may discourage innovation? To explore this question, we exploit the fact that technologies experienced a differential decline in competition depending on the state of competition before the creation of a pool. All pool technologies were affected by complementarities across pool technologies, as well as lower litigation risks and license fees, but only technologies for which the pool combined patents by competing firms, experienced a decline in competition. Comparisons of changes in patenting across pool technologies indicate that the observed decline in patenting was driven almost entirely by technologies that experienced a decline in competition as a result of the pool. Estimates are robust to alternative tests, which exclude cross-reference subclasses from the sample and instead use pool subclasses with a single pool patent as an alternative control.
Archival evidence suggests two mechanisms by which the creation of a pool may limit competition and discourage innovation to improve the pool technology. First, a pool may increase litigation risks for outside firms -even as it reduces such risks for members -because outside firms now have to face the entire group of pool member in court. This threat is particularly severe for pools that combine patents by a group of large firms, which agree to jointly defend their patents. Second, an agreement to pool patents may be accompanied by agreements to divide markets, which eliminate competition among pool members and make it difficult for new firms to enter the industry. This feature poses a particular risk in the absence of effective antitrust.
We also investigate whether the observed decline may be driven by a decline in lower quality or "strategic" patents. Analyses of citation-weighted patents indicate a moderate, albeit significant decline in quality-adjusted patents, implying a moderate increase in the quality of patents for pool technologies after the creation of a pool. Subclasses with one additional pool patent produced 11 percent fewer citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool, compared with a 14 percent decline in the main specifications. Comparisons across pool subclasses with one versus more pool members confirm that the differential decline in quality-adjusted patenting is driven by technologies for which the creation of a pool combines patents by competing firms.
15 Surveys of research labs indicate that many firms value patents for strategic reasons (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . In a sample of 95 publicly traded semiconductor firms, firms with large capital investments increased their propensity to patent between 1979 and 1995 as a strategic response to the threat of patent litigation and hold-up (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). 16 For example, Spencer and Grindley (1993, p. 15) note that a principal benefit of the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology (Sematech) consortium, a research joint venture formed in 1987 between leading U.S. semiconductor firms, was that "central funding and testing can lower the costs of equipment development and introduction by reducing the duplication of firms' efforts to develop and qualify new tools." Consistent with the elimination of duplicative R&D, Irwin and Klenow (1996) find that Sematech caused its members to reduce their overall R&D spending by $300 million per year. Loury's (1979) model of investment in R&D under uncertainty implies that more firms enter than is socially optimal because they do not take account of the parallel nature of R&D. suggesting that the creation of a pool may have led to a substantial delay in the adoption of color film.
I. DATA
To examine changes in patenting after the creation of a pool, we collected a new data set of 75,396 patent applications between 1921 and 1948 to cover 10 years before the first pool formed and 10 years after the last pool formed. These data include 433 pool subclasses and 828 cross-reference subclasses without pool patents in the same industry.
To construct measures for the quality of patented inventions, we also collected 322,998
citations to these patents after 1921.
These data extend existing data sets in three important ways. First, they include application years in addition to grant years to more accurately measure the timing of invention. The distinction between application and grant years is important because grants can occur several years after application, depending on the workload of examiners (e.g., Popp, Juhl, and Johnson 2004; Gans, Stern, and Hsu 2008) . We extract application years between 1921 and 1948 through a key word search, which yields application years for 97.7 percent of 1,069,414 patents issued between 1921 and 1948. 18 The mean lag between application and grant is 2.5 years with a standard deviation of 1.9 years (Appendix Figure A. 1).
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In addition, our data include information on cross-reference subclasses (subsection , 1930-1938 To construct data on patents that were included in a pool, we first collected all mentions of patent pools from Vaughan (1956) , Gilbert (2004) , and Lerner, Tirole, and Strojwas (2007) , and then searched the records of the National Archives in Chicago, Kansas City, New York, and Riverside for lists of all patents that were included in these pools. 20 Pools covered a broad range of industries (Table I) ranging from hydraulic 18 For example, we search the full text of patent grants for the words "iling" (for "Filing") and "Ser." (for "Serial Number") to recover the year associated with this block of text. In a random sample of 300 patents, the algorithm correctly records application years for 296 patents. 19 In comparison, Popp, Juhl, and Johnson (2004) find that the average U.S. patent between 1976 and 1996 was granted 28 months after the application (with a standard deviation of 20 months). 20 For 13 pools, pool patents are available from consent decrees at the National Archives; for 5 pools, pool patents are included in licensing agreements; for 3 pools, patents are listed in written complaints, and for another 3 pools, patents are included in the final judgments. For four pools in railroad springs, Phillips screws, film, and eyeglasses, patents are listed in more than one source. In comparison with Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole (2007) , our sample includes 8 additional pools between 1930 and 1938 and omits 15 pools for which pool patents are not available. We also exclude a pool for television and radio apparatus because it did not include any U.S. firms, a pool for male hormones (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) 
A. Pool patents in 20 industries

B. Patents per year in pool and cross-reference subclasses
The main specifications compare changes in the number of patent applications per year in 433 pool subclasses with changes in 828 cross-reference subclasses. For example, U.S. patent 1,908,080 (issued May 9, 1933) for a cross-recessed (Phillips)
"screw" belongs to the primary subclass 411/403 for "externally threaded fastener elements," which we define as a "pool subclass." 22 U.S. patent 1,908,080 is also assigned to three cross-reference subclasses: 411/919 ("screw having driving contact"), 470/60
("apparatus for making externally threaded fastener"), 470/9 ("threaded, headed fastener, or washer making: process-screw"), which form the control in the main specifications.
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The average pool patent is assigned to 2.0 cross-reference subclasses. Alternative specifications limit the control to cross-reference subclasses within the same main class, and a "pool" for grinding hobs (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) because it combined two patents by the Barber-Colman Company. 21 Sixteen pools included grant-back provisions, which required pool members to contribute new patents for related technologies to the pool, and may have exacerbated pool members' incentives to free ride on R&D by other members (e.g., Aoki and Nagaoka 2004) . 22 Seven subclasses include patents by more than one pool; for them, we define the year of pool formation using the earliest pool. One subclass (352/225) is listed as a pool subclass for two pools. Four subclasses (340/524, 62/056, 524/594, and 174/152R) are pool and cross-reference subclasses; two subclasses (417/426 and 200/56R) are cross-reference subclasses for two pools. We assign them to the pool that formed first. For five pools (fuel injection, pharmaceuticals, railroad springs, lecithin, and aircraft instruments), the pool years include a small number of years after the pool had dissolved. To be conservative we include these years as pool years.
and expand the control to include all subclasses in the main class (e.g. class 411
"fasteners").
Of 433 pool subclasses, 327 include one pool patent, and 106 include multiple pool patents (Table II) . Thirty-eight subclasses with multiple pool patents include patents by multiple firms. For example, a pool for wrinkle finishes combined Kay and Ess' U.S. patent 2,077,112 for "imitation leather paper" with the Chadeloid Chemical Company's patent 1,689,892 for "wrinkle finishes." Both patents are assigned to USPTO subclass 427/257, which covers inventions to produce an "irregular surface…by intentionally employing coating materials which dry to a wrinkled appearance or which crack on drying to produce a 'crackled' finish."
C. Citations by patents after 1921 as a control for patent quality
Trajtenberg ( File (77 percent) were cited by at least one other patent in the NBER data; conditional on being cited, the average patent was cited 7.7 times.
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II. RESULTS
For pool technologies, patent applications declined after the creation of a pool, both in absolute terms and relative to alternative definitions of the control. In pool subclasses, patent applications declined from 2.54 per subclass and year before the creation of a pool to 2.40 afterwards (Table II) , and from 2.80 to 2.48 within a 10-year window before and after the creation of a pool ( Figure I ). For cross-reference subclasses, comparisons of means indicate a slight increase in patenting: patent applications in cross-reference subclasses increased from 2.70 before the creation of a pool to 2.94 afterwards (Table II) .
Data on changes in patenting, however, indicate that, after a small initial increase, patenting began to decline in cross-reference subclasses, following changes for pool subclasses, albeit at a smaller rate ( Figure I ). These patterns are suggestive of negative spillover effects from pool subclasses to cross-references subclasses, which will lead tests with cross-reference subclasses as a control to underestimate a decline in patenting as a 25 To evaluate the quality of these data, we examined page scans for 150 randomly chosen patents between 1947 and 1974 on Google Patents (www.google.com/patents). This check indicates that the algorithm correctly identifies 636 of 741 (86 percent) of citations; 5 of 105 citations that the algorithm missed were misread numbers (i.e. false positives) as a result of errors in the optical character recognition (OCR). 26 Linking patents to citations with a long lag may, however, miss many important citations. For example, Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe (2010) find that patent citations in the NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File peak one year after the original grant.
result of the pool. Until the creation of a pool, counts of patent applications per year follow similar trends for pool subclasses and cross-reference subclasses.
A. Baseline estimates
Baseline difference-in-differences regressions compare changes in the number of patent applications per subclass and year in pool subclasses with an additional pool patent with changes in the number of patent applications in cross-reference subclasses, controlling for subclass and year fixed effects:
where the variable pool patents c counts the number of pool patents in subclass c, and pool ct equals 1 if subclass c includes at least one pool patent and year t is after the creation of a pool. Under the assumption that changes in patent applications per year would be comparable in pool and cross-reference subclasses in the absence of a pool, the coefficient for the difference-in-differences estimator pool ct * pool patents c measures the causal effect of the creation of a pool. We will investigate this assumption in the following section. Year fixed effects δ t and subclass-fixed effects f c control for differential changes in patenting between pool subclasses and the control that are independent of the creation of a pool. Standard errors are clustered at the subclass level.
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Baseline estimates indicate that subclasses with one additional pool patent produce 0.36 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table III , column 1). Compared with a mean of 2.47 patents per year in pool subclasses (Table II) , this represents a 14.37 percent decline in patenting after the creation of a pool.
Alternative specifications define exposure to a pool more flexibly through a binary 27 Estimates remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level, if we cluster standard errors at the industry (rather than the subclass) level to control for unobservable industry-level variation that may affect both pool subclasses and the control, with a standard error for pool ct * pool patents c of 0.11, compared with 0.10 if we cluster at the subclass level.
variable for pool subclasses c , which equals 1 for any subclass that includes at least one pool patent. Estimates indicate that pool subclasses produce 0.40 fewer patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table III , column 2), implying a decline of 16.32 percent.
Regressions with interactions between year and industry dummies, to flexibly control for differential changes in patenting across industries and over time (e.g., as a result of changes in patenting across the life-cycle of an industry), indicate that subclasses with one additional pool patent produce 0.32 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table III , column 3), implying a decline of 12.83 percent.
Results are also robust to alternative specifications, which allow for separate linear and quadratic trends for each of the 433 pool subclasses. Estimates with quadratic trends indicate that pool subclasses with one additional pool patent produce 0.39 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table III , column 4), implying a decline of 15.59 percent.
Consistent with the fact that outside firms produce more than 97 percent of all patents in the average industry, excluding all patents by pool members does not change the size of the estimates. In regressions that exclude all 2,058 patents by pool members, pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produce 0.34 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table III , column 5), implying a 14.46 percent decline compared with a mean of 2.33 patents per year in pool subclasses.
B. Time varying estimates for the pre-and post pool period
To test for differential pre-trends, which would violate the identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator, and to investigate the timing of effects, we estimate coefficients separately for each year, allowing the estimated effect to begin before the creation of a pool:
where pool patents c is defined as above, and k =-17,-16….17, 18 denotes years before and after the creation of a pool forms; k=0 is the excluded period.
Annual coefficients are not statistically significant in any year except t-1, when estimates imply a 9.31 percent increase in patenting. This is consistent with the idea of a (potentially wasteful) patent race leading up to the creation of a pool (e.g., Baron and Pohlmann 2011; Dequiedt and Versaevel 2012) . Excluding data for year t-1, however, leads only to a moderate reduction in the size of the estimate to -0.34 for the baseline specification (significant at the 1 percent level, not reported), which implies a 13.93
percent decline compared with a mean of 2.44 patents.
Most importantly, however, estimates imply a decline in patenting that begins after the creation of a pool and intensifies over time. Annual coefficients range from -0.17 to -0.30, with an average -0.23 for the first five years, implying a decline of 9.31 percent, and from -0.34 to -0.69, with an average of -0.43 for years six and above, implying a decline of 17.41 percent (significant at 5 percent in years one, three, four and all years above five, Figure II ).
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C. Controlling for patent quality through citations
A potential shortcoming with patents as a proxy for innovation is that patented inventions "differ greatly in 'quality,' in the magnitude of inventive output associated with them" (Griliches 1990 (Griliches , p. 1669 . To address this issue, we use data on patent citations as a measure for the quality of patented inventions. Following Trajtenberg (1990) we repeat the main specifications using citation-weighted patents:
(3) Citation-weighted patents ct = patents by application year 1921-1948 ct + citations in patent grants 1921-2002 to patent applications 1921-1948 ct 28 Regressions with industry-year interactions confirm these results. Estimates become statistically significant, with an estimate of -0.32 three years after the creation of a pool, implying a decline of 12.96 percent, and remain significant through the sample, with an estimate of -0.40 ten years after the creation of a pool, implying a decline of 16.19 percent (significant at 5 percent, Appendix Figure A. 2).
Citation-weighted patents increase for both pool and cross-reference subclasses over time, because more recent patents are more likely to be cited (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001; Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe 2010) , but the increase is substantially smaller for pool subclasses. After the creation of a pool, the average pool subclass produced 15.12 citation-weighted patents, compared with 9.89 before. By comparison, the average crossreference subclass produced 19.40 citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool, compared with 11.61 before (Table II) .
Estimates with citation-weighted patents are statistically significant and large, albeit slightly smaller than the main estimates. Subclasses with an additional pool patent produce 1.42 fewer citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table IV , column 1), implying an 11.33 percent decline. 29 Analyses that exclude member patents from the sample indicate that subclasses with an additional pool patent produce 1.42 fewer citation-weighted patents (significant at 1 percent, Table IV , column 5), implying an 11.97 percent decline in quality-adjusted patents, compared with a mean of 11.84 non-member citation-weighted patents per year in pool subclasses. Although the difference between an 11.33 percent decline with citation-weighted patents and a 14.37 percent decline with raw patent counts is relatively small, it is consistent with a decline in the share of strategic patenting after the creation of a pool.
Annual coefficients with citation-weighted patents confirm that the decline in patenting begins after the creation of a pool and intensifies over time, even when controlling for the quality of patents. Annual coefficients become statistically significant in year 6 and range from -1.02 to -2.93, with an average of 1.66 (significant at 5 percent, Figure III ) implying a decline of 13.29 percent.
D. Additional robustness checks
Additional robustness checks estimate the main specifications with alternative definitions of the control, as Poisson regressions, and excluding pools that formed after 29 Results are robust to alternative tests that remove patents that were not cited, and weight citation counts by the average number of citations to patents issued in the same year.
1935, as well as individual pools. The first test restricts the control group to 631 crossreference classes in the same 108 main classes that include at least one of 433 pool subclasses; the restricted sample includes 62,898 patents. Compared with cross-reference subclasses in the same main class, pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produce 0.37 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 14.78 percent decline, and 1.47 fewer citation-weighted patents, implying an 11.76 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, Table V , columns 1 and 2).
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We also repeat the main specifications as conditional fixed-effects Poisson regressions to control for the count data characteristics of patents, allowing for correlation over time. 31 Poisson estimates imply that subclasses with one additional pool patent produce 8.70 percent fewer patents and 7.41 percent fewer citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table V , columns 3 and 4).
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An additional robustness check excludes two subclasses with exceptionally many patents: aircraft instruments (12 pool patents) and stamped metal wheels (10 pool patents). 33 Estimates with the restricted sample indicate that subclasses with an additional pool patents produce 0.29 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 11.80 percent decline, and 1.43 fewer citation-weighted patents, implying an 11.52 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, Table V , columns 5 and 6). Annual coefficients display less volatility in the pre-pool period and confirm the timing of the baseline estimates. For example, the estimate for t-5 is 0.07 ( Figure IV , compared with 30 Results are also robust to expanding the control to include all 69,316 subclasses without pool patents in 108 main classes with at least one pool subclass and in 61 classes with at least one cross-reference subclasses; this expands the sample to 807,326 patents. Estimates suggest that pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produce 0.30 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a decline of 12.11 percent (significant at 1 percent, not reported). In this control group, patent applications increased from 1.00 per year before the creation of a pool to 1.11 afterwards. 31 The Poisson model is robust to misspecifications of the distribution and to a disproportionate share of zeros in the dependent variable. Wooldridge (1999) develops a quasi-maximum-likelihood estimator for the fixed effects Poisson model that is also robust to correlation over time; Rysman and Simcoe (2008) implement the estimator. Estimated effects are also robust to restricting the sample to pools that formed before May 27, 1935, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that price-and wage-fixing in the poultry industry, which had been sanctioned under the NIRA, were unconstitutional.
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Regressions with the restricted sample indicate that subclasses with an additional pool patent produce 0.38 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 14.71 percent decline, and 1.36 fewer citation-weighted patents, implying a 10.32 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, 
A. Differential changes in the intensity of competition
Summary statistics indicate that the observed decline in patenting for pool technologies is driven almost entirely by technologies for which the pool combines patents by competing firms. In subclasses with multiple members, patents per year decline from 4.20 patents per year before the creation of a pool to 2.60 afterwards (Table   II) . Restricting the data to a 10-year window before and after the creation of a pool, patents per year decline from 4.43 patents before the creation of a pool to 2.73 patents afterwards ( Figure V 
B. Subclasses with a single pool patent as an alternative control
We also examine whether the use of cross-reference subclasses as a control may overstate the decline in patenting for pool technologies -despite similar pre-trends in patenting -because the creation of a pool encouraged patenting in cross-reference subclasses. For example, the creation of a pool that resolves blocking patents may stimulate invention in technologies that are complementary to pool technologies; if these technologies are included in cross-reference subclasses, patenting may increase in crossreference subclasses after the creation of a pool.
A long-term decline in patenting in cross-reference subclasses, however, is suggestive of negative spillover effects from pool subclasses to cross-references subclasses ( Figure I ), suggesting that additional patents in cross-reference subclasses are unlikely to drive the differential decline in patenting for pool technologies. To be conservative, however, we exclude cross-reference subclasses from the sample in an additional test and instead use subclasses with a single pool patent -in which the creation of a pool did not affect the intensity of competition -as a control for changes in subclasses with multiple pool patents and multiple firms.
This test indicates that cross-reference subclasses are a conservative control and also confirms that subclasses, in which the pool combines patents by multiple members, drive the observed decline. Subclasses in which the creation of a pool combines patents by multiple firms produce 1.66 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool compared with subclasses with a single pool patent (significant at 1 percent, Results are also robust to controlling for the quality of patents (Table VIII, column 3). Difference-in-differences estimates with citation-weighted patents indicate that subclasses with multiple pool firms are associated with 5.18 fewer citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table VIII , column 3), implying a 34.58 percent decline relative to a mean of 14.98.
C. Archival evidence on mechanisms to limit competition
Archival evidence illustrates alternative mechanisms by which a pool may limit competition and discourage innovation. 
IV. NON-PATENT MEASURES OF INNOVATION
Archival records for the movie industry -which accounts for the largest number of patents in our sample -suggest that a pool delayed technical progress and the transition from black-and-white to color film. In the early 1930s, Technicolor had dominated the market for professional color cinematography with a method that simultaneously ran three separate strips of film, which covered different parts of the color spectrum, through a specialized camera. Technicolor's three-strip process produced an exceptionally vivid color scheme. Technicolor was in complete control of the market and charged high rental fees for his camera equipment and for the use of its film.
Technicolor and its competitor Kodak began to pursue parallel and independent research to develop an alternative method to produce color film, which ran a single strip of celluloid on regular black-and-white cameras. was too grainy for studio work, and was only used for outdoor shots that the company's bulky three-strip cameras could not reach (Haines 1993, p. 28; Basten 2005, p. 127) .
Until 1945, their pooling agreement included a covenant that Kodak "refrain from engaging in the commercial processing of wide 'monopack' film." On December 14, 1945, Technicolor and Eastman Kodak amended their agreement to remove the covenant, but a government complaint in 1947 observed that Kodak "continued to refrain from the commercial processing of wide 'monopack' film, from licensing others to engage in such processing, and, with minor exceptions, from selling such film with the right to process to customers other than Technicolor…the development of the art of professional color cinematography by others than Technicolor has been retarded, to the detriment of the general public, the motion picture industry, and the film manufacturing industry."
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To investigate whether the creation of a pool may have delayed the "art of professional color cinematography," we collected data on the color scheme of 1,912
feature-length movies from the catalogues of the American Film Institute (AFI) between 1930 and 1960. 45 These data indicate that, for as long as the pool was active, the majority of movies continued to be filmed in black-and-white ( Figure VI) . Exceptional movies that were shot in color -such as "The Wizard of Oz" and "Gone with the Wind" (both 1939) -were extremely costly to produce, with production costs of $2,777,000, equivalent to $45,000,000 year 2011 U.S. dollars, and $3,957,000, equivalent to $64,100,000 year 2011 U.S. dollars (based on percentage changes in the CPI, Officer and
Williamson 2011). In 1935, shooting a movie using Technicolor's cumbersome and expensive three-strip method increased production costs by 30 percent relative to average production costs of $300,000 per feature (Kindem 1979, p. 34) .
44 United States v. Technicolor, Inc. (Civil No. 7507-M, S.D. Calif.; Complaint, 1947, paras. 18 and 27 ). An estimate of -0.07 for the baseline specification implies a 4.52 percent decline compared with a mean of 1.66 patents per pool subclass in the film industry. Regressions with citation-weighted patents yield an estimate of -0.96 (significant at 5 percent), implying a 10.52 percent decline compared with a mean of 9.12. 45 The AFI catalogues include information on the cast, crew, genre, and technical characteristics of nearly 60,000 feature-length movies that were produced in the U.S. or financed by U.S. production companies between 1893 and 2012 (www.afi.com).
Data on R&D investments indicate a delay in investments as a result of the pool. Eastmancolor. In 1952, Kodak introduced an improved monopack technology with higher emulsion speed and better grain structure that allowed its technology to meet the standards of the major Hollywood studios. 48 In the 1950s, many studios created new color processes using Eastmancolor film (Basten 2005, p. 128) . Complaint, 1947; Consent Judgments, 1948 and 1950) . 47 Haines (1993, p. 28) describes the monopack technology: "The Monopack stock contained silver halides which were exposed through thin layers of filters during principal photography. The filters allowed light to pass through each layer to generate black and white latent image of the red, green and blue records. During development, the film went through three bleaches that contained 'dye couplers.' Dye couplers were tiny color globules, which replicated the latent silver image of each record. After the dyes were "coupled" with the latent image of each layer, the silver was washed away. The end result was a three color positive image with each hue represented by a think layer of dye couplers." The principle of colored dye couplers (U.S. patents 2,428,054 and 2,449,054) was made operational in Eastmancolor (Frost and Oppenheim 1960, p. 115-116) . 48 When consent degrees threatened to dissolve the pool, pool members resumed their research to improve the monopack technology and, soon after the pool dissolved, both pool members and outside firms began to offer a variety of high-quality versions of color film, which sped up the switch to producing movies in color.
The analysis also indicates that changes in the intensity of competition are a key mechanism by which a patent pool may discourage innovation. Patent data show that the observed decline in patenting was driven almost entirely by pool technologies for which the pool combined patents by competing firm. By comparison, the data indicate no significant change in patenting for pool technologies in which a single pool member owned all pool patents before the pool had formed.
Archival evidence suggests two main mechanisms by which the creation of a pool may weaken competition and discourage innovation. First, the creation of a pool may increase litigation risks for outside firms, even as it lowers risks for members, because outside firms must now expect to face all pool members jointly as a group in court. This threat is particularly severe if a pool combines patents by a group of dominant firms, and if the pool includes joint defense agreements and dedicated litigation funds. Second, pooling agreements may be accompanied by market sharing agreements, which discourage innovation by eliminating competition among members and by discouraging entry. This threat is particularly severe in the absence of effective regulation.
More generally, findings of a positive link between competition and innovation are consistent with theoretical models which predict that -starting from low levels of competition -shifts towards competition may encourage innovation as they encourage firms to invest in R&D to avoid neck-and-neck competition (Aghion et al. 2001; Aghion et al. 2005) . Similar to today, many of the industries that formed patent pools in the Notes: Data from license agreements, written complaints, and court opinions from regional depositories of the National Archives in Chicago (railroad springs, machine tools, Phillips screws, lecithin, stamped metal wheels, wrinkle finishes, and fuse cutouts), Kansas City (ophthalmic frames), New York City (high tension cables, water conditioning, fuel injection, pharmaceuticals, textile machinery, dry ice, electric equipment, variable condensers, aircraft instruments), and Riverside (color film). Member firms and pool patents are measured at the time of the initial pooling agreement. Trajtenberg 1990 ). The timing of invention is measured by the application year for granted patents. The variable pool equals 1 after a pool forms. # pool patents counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and list subclass c as their primary subclass. Columns (7) and (8) exclude five pools for stamped metal wheels, wrinkle finishes, dropout cutouts, ophthalmic frames, and slip covers that were formed after the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was ruled unconstitutional on May 27, 1935 in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935 . Excluded group is subclasses with exactly 1 pool patent. >1 pool patent*1 firm equals 1 if subclass c includes more than 1 pool patent owned by a single member firm (68 subclasses). >1 pool patent*>1 firm equals 1 if subclass c includes patents owned by multiple member firms (38 subclasses). 433 pool subclasses include one or more pool patents. 327 subclass with 1 pool patent form the control. Bootstrap standard errors reported in columns (2) and (4).
FIGURE I -PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR: POOL VERSUS CROSS-REFERENCE SUBCLASSES
Notes: t=0 denotes the year when a pool forms; the timing of invention is measured at the year of the patent application. Data include patent counts for 433 pool subclasses that include at least one pool patent and 828 cross-reference subclasses that patent examiners have identified as related technologies. -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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FIGURE II -ANNUAL COEFFICIENTS, OLS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR
Notes: t=0 denotes the year when a pool forms; the timing of invention is measured at the year of the patent application. Estimates for β k in the regression Patents ct = α + β k * pool patents c + f c + δ t + ε ct where k =-17,…,17, 18, counts years before and after a pool forms. The variable pool patents c counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and that list subclass c as their primary subclass. Pool Start Year
FIGURE III -ANNUAL COEFFICIENTS, OLS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS CITATIONS-WEIGHTED PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR
Notes: t=0 denotes the year when a pool forms; the timing of invention is measured at the year of the patent application. Estimates for β k in the regression Patents ct = α + β k * pool patents c + f c + δ t + ε ct where k =-17,…,17, 18, counts years before and after a pool forms. The variable pool patents c counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and that list subclass c as their primary subclass. Citations-weighted patents are constructed as 1+ # of citations by later patents (following Trajtenberg 1990). Pool Start Year FIGURE IV -ANNUAL COEFFICIENTS, OLS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR EXCLUDING POOL SUBCLASSES WITH 10 AND 12 POOL PATENTS Notes: t=0 denotes the year when a pool forms; the timing of invention is measured at the year of the patent application. Estimates for β k in the regression Patents ct = α + β k * pool patents c + f c + δ t + ε ct where k =-17,…,17, 18, counts years before and after a pool forms. The variable pool patents c counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and that list subclass c as their primary subclass. Excludes subclasses exceptionally many patents: aircraft instruments (subclass 261/41.5 with 12 pool patents) and stamped metal wheels (subclass 301/35.59 with 10 pool patents). Pool Start Year
FIGURE V -PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR: POOL SUBCLASSES WITH 1 VERSUS >1 POOL MEMBERS
Notes: t=0 denotes the year when a pool forms; the timing of invention is measured at the year of the patent application. Data include 433 pool subclasses that include at least one pool patent and 828 cross-reference subclasses that patent examiners have identified as related technologies. For 38 pool subclasses, the creation of a pool combines patents by multiple members. Pool Start Year
